The advantages would cover a broad spectrum if Japan adopted the social contract. The current concepts of administration, ruling party, bureaucrats, Diet members, local assembly members, and the assemblies themselves would change drastically. It would also have influence in a great number of legal revisions and economic effects.

(1) Effect on the administration Prefectural governors would be able to concentrate during their 4-year term on enacting the detailed policies that they raised in the elections. The local assemblies can restrict actions through checks and balances, but the governor - chief executive with singular authority - will lose the next election if unable to achieve the goals set out. It's different on a national level. Under the existing single-seat constituency system, elections are contested with each party declaring the policies of its social contract. The manifesto of Blair's Labour Party serves as a fine example in terms of degree of detail. It truly is a fully-detailed document, complete in most cases with time frames, financing, and other figures. With this, the electorate can determine which party to vote for. That is to say, the key to a good social contract is how much it embodies the themes that the people want politicians to tackle. It also makes evaluation of performance more objective when, four years down the line, people are asking how many of its social contract promises the party in power fulfilled. In England this is termed a "performance vote" for the ruling party. In Japan too, election campaigning would change if each party advocated a thoroughly detailed social contract. The current popularity vote for a favorite candidate would give way, and the deciding factor would rest in the party of the candidate. Because Japan is a Parliamentary system, the party winning the majority of seats makes up the cabinet, and the party leader becomes prime minister. As each party drafts its policies, this activity supposedly centers on the opinions of the party leader. In other words, endorsing a given party's social contract is equivalent to endorsing the party leader, and in the election the people can choose the leader of the ruling party, i.e. the prime minister. Prime Minister Koizumi wanted the prime minister to be elected by the people, and by employing this Japanese version of the social contract, we could essentially realize a popular election of the prime minister without changing the Japanese Constitution.

(2) Effect on the ruling party At present, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) requires a 3-step preliminary review of government-sponsored legislation: <1>policy/inquiry committee, <2> policy deliberation commission, and <3> executive council. This review is being disregarded by the Koizumi cabinet, so divisions between the ruling party and the cabinet frequently surface. If social contracts were used in general elections, and the policies of the social contracts proposed in detail, then this sort of preliminary review is by principle no longer necessary. Because the general direction and outline of proposed policies would be settled in detail during the election, the only task remaining would be to fill in the specifics, and clashes with the cabinet like we see now should disappear (or decrease). The behavior of Diet members would also change. The activity of so-called zoku-giin, Diet members representing special interests or government ministries, will cease to be effective. The "hometown lobby" will only be considered so far as it relates to current policy, and would probably be mediated by the appropriate vice minister or ministerial aide. Even if a Zoku-giin meets with a bureaucrat, it would be nothing to worry about, because bureaucrats don't possess that sort of discretionary power. And with respect to administrative expenses paid to Diet members - an area where we've seen many recent abuses - legislation ought to be revised (Law Regarding Outlay of Administrative Expenses for Diet Factions) so that expenses are gathered by parties to be used exclusively for staffing and administrative expenses relating to the parties' policy formation. Currently the parties themselves are considerably understaffed.

(3) Effect on bureaucrats Because a manifesto is a rather thoroughly detailed document, there remains no room for bureaucrats to make value judgments or offer opposition. The bureaucrat's role is reduced to that of assisting to carry out the policies of the ruling party. Article 15 of the Japanese Constitution contains the language, "all public officials are servants of the whole community"; indeed, by serving the government of the day, these officials are ultimately serving the entire nation. If change of administration were made systematic by use of a single-seat constituency system, serving the government of the majority party would mean not serving a part of the population. This would necessitate revisions in the National Public Service Law to enable appointment by the cabinet of each position at or above the bureau director/deputy director level, in the same fashion as U.S. political appointees and ministerial appointees in England. Government employees below this level would be able to pursue their civil service careers until retirement in an executive capacity. Even now, academics, business executives, specialists, and civilians are increasingly being appointed to a variety of policy commissions and other government committees, so it is possible to say that, to that extent, political appointees are in actuality being used. The Local Public Service Law is the same in this respect. It must be revised so that the governor may freely appoint the deputy governor, treasurer, deputy mayor, and other staff that directly support the governor's policies. In that case, to prevent the evils involved with bureaucrats landing cushy jobs in the public sector after retirement, it might be a good idea to guarantee civil servants who lose their jobs with change in administration a life-long pension of 80% of their annual salary at retirement. This would help to reduce such actions as setting up a corporation during active service to serve as a safety net after retirement, and would allow them to devote themselves to their work, faithfully following the orders of the government or governor.

(4) Revision of election laws, creation of a party law In elections today, from the standpoint of the public, it is almost as though there were absolutely no information available on who to vote for. The candidates' policies are not organized in a way meaningful to the electorate. This is not an era when names are simply repeated. There is no ideological conflict now as in the past. This is an age when both the LDP and Democratic Party bicker over the effectiveness of specific existing policies. This closely resembles the way corporations create, revise, and announce management plans and budgets every year... or every 3 months. Diplomacy, law and order, and the economy have suffered direct hits from dizzying changes in the international scene, and are forced to adapt on a daily basis. The needs of the public and corporations with respect to the government are also undergoing transformation in this environment, and the days when people quietly support the LDP "just because" are gone. Perhaps we could say that even in politics a doctrine of contingency has become necessary. In the recent local elections, it was very welcome when candidates who announced social contracts either won or made a good showing in the polls. There is an urgent need to grant broad freedom in election campaigning, such as door-to-door canvassing and distribution of handbills, so each member of the electorate can vote for the candidate who shares his or her political views, and to make possible the creation of a social contract with the candidate. The Public Office Election Law must at any cost be revised to regulate this. The law regulates most political activities, and plays the frightening role of leading citizens to think that amateurs are unable, or even not allowed, to assist in elections. It is truly embarrassing, as a developed nation, that we so thoroughly prevent the most important of fundamental human rights - people's expression of political views. I would like to see the laws revised so that office workers and other normal people may assist in campaign activity without a problem. That is why we must create a Political Party Law. However, a Political Party Law is said to be double-edged, so we must create methods of repression and enforcement (penalties) to prevent the evil of party officials being influenced by their power, as happens in government.

(5) An opportunity for reform in the economic framework We can summarize Japan's current emergency economic policies in the following three: <1> create jobs for the unemployed, <2> cultivate a service industry, the new industry to maintain Japan in the 21st century, and macroeconomically <3> raise the economic growth rate to a sustainable level. We can take the first steps with <1> and <2> only after eliminating the controls that are currently in place. As I see it, the government market occupies about 40%, and adding regulated markets this comes to 60%. The corporations dominating these government and regulated markets have almost no tax obligation, including resident's tax, property tax, consumption tax as well as corporate tax. Tax reform has been touted as a way to economic recovery, but isn't this ignoring the primary fact that many companies in our country have no tax obligation? <3> is the general direction we are heading, the result of <1> and <2>. We can no longer sustain the second-ranking global GDP by manufacturing alone. We must largely develop a service industry built around intellectual and creative property. This service industry could consist, in part, of incorporated education, health care, welfare, and childcare - usually the realm of government or non-profits. By their deregulation, it is anticipated that over 20 trillion yen in annual sales can be made. At present these regulated industries are subsidized, while at the same time tax-exempt. By eliminating regulation in these areas, corporate tax, resident's tax, consumption tax and other tax revenues could be drawn from the 20 trillion yen in sales, just like any other corporation, and subsidies will become unnecessary. The economic benefits of such deregulation are inestimable. A portion of reforms in corporate education, health care, welfare, and childcare are moving along per the Law for Structural Reform in Special Districts, but in both central and local governments we should be demanding that these reforms be included in social contracts and decisively acted upon.

*1 Tokyo Legal Mind, ed., "C-BOOK Constitution 'Governance,'" p.52
*2 Katsuhiko Fujimori, "Blair's Reform The Third Way" (TBS Britannica, 2002)

References
<1> Institute of Policy Studies, Yokkaichi University, "Local Manifesto," (Imagine Publishing, 2003)
<2> National Institute for Research Advancement, "NIRA Policy Research: a Study on Election and Choice of National Policy," (National Institute for Research Advancement, 1996)